Reward methodology

Verified HISS trading fees support xHISS stakers, long-term vault depositors, healthy vault providers, and the HISS Treasury Safe. This page explains, in plain language, how the Vault Contributor and Vault Provider rewards are decided under the current methodology, HISS_REWARD_METHOD_V2 (label “V2”). It describes the rules, not amounts — realised allocations are published per epoch. V2's retroactive V1→V2 catch-up is executed on-chain (reserves custodied at the Safe, treasury trued up, economic burn done); the forward daily cycle is run by the OpenClaw agent and monthly epochs are pending, so nothing is funded, rooted, vesting, or claimable yet. The rules are frozen in code so the dashboards can never quietly disagree with the mechanism.

The split (V2 — current)

Only verified HISS trading fees are ever split. Under V2 the eligible base splits 50 / 15 / 15 / 10 / 10 across five legs: 50% to xHISS stakers, 15% to Vault Providers, 15% to Vault Contributors, 10% to the 2-of-3 HISS Treasury Safe (which also absorbs the floor-division dust so the five legs sum exactly), and 10% to an economic burn. The 15% creator vesting premint and 100% of claimed WETH are excluded — WETH goes entirely to the Treasury Safe and is never part of this split.

Economic burn (10%). The burn leg is a dead-address transfer: HISS is transferred to the canonical dead address (0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dEaD) and removed from protocol-controlled circulation. This is an economic burn — a dead-address transfer does not reduce HISS.totalSupply, and no copy may say “supply burned” or “supply reduced”. The retroactive migration executed the full cumulative economic burn — ≈219.16M HISS to the dead address — proven by committed receipts and confirmable live as the dead-address balance; HISS.totalSupply is unchanged.

Deployer exclusion. A 100,000,000e18 deployer FEE_REVENUE transfer (tx 0x196763e0f7dff4b7ee84fb35d53693ea085c52857108e633ff2269e8f925fb40, from EOA 0x403bad53f39a74154a1c9a86852e443738328761) is excluded from the entire V2 fee base and FIFO-attributed to the earliest claim (claim 1). It sits outside reward-method accounting.

Retroactive true-up. V2 retroactively and cumulatively re-scores the historical fee ledger and trues it up under the new split. Prior irreversible on-chain transfers are counted as actuals — never reversed. The migration is executed on-chain; complete is true (reserves custodied at the Safe, treasury trued up, burn done). The monthly epoch funding cadence is owner-gated Safe funding and is not yet run.

Historical (V1). The prior methodology HISS_REWARD_METHOD_V1 split the same input 50 / 30 / 10 / 10 (50% xHISS stakers, 30% depositor vesting, 10% provider rewards, 10% treasury). V2 supersedes it; V1 is retained for the record and is never the current split. The scoring, eligibility, and vesting mechanics below are unchanged by the migration — only the leg shares and cohort names changed.

Vault Contributor rewards (15%)

“Vault Contributors” is the current name for the depositor cohort; the methodology is identical to the historical depositor-vesting leg — same facts-only eligibility, same vesting shape. Depositor rewards are based on time-weighted vault participation. Depositor rewards vest over 30 days.

Your reward tracks eligible share-seconds — the shares you hold multiplied by the seconds you hold them over the epoch. Those are grouped by the vault’s provider, passed through a concave anti-dominance curve on aggregated group participation, and capped so no single provider group takes more than 40% of the contributor pool. The result is split linearly across vaults and then across contributors. Excluded and self-dealing wallets contribute zero.

Designed to resist common timing, self-deposit, vault-spam, and snapshot strategies. Grouping by provider means splitting one deposit across many vaults gains nothing. Time-weighting means a last-second, snapshot-timed deposit earns in proportion to seconds held, not to a moment. The concave curve is applied to the whole group, never per wallet, so Sybil-splitting is not amplified.

Vault Provider rewards (15%)

Provider rewards are based on durable external capital, depositor retention, and objective operational quality. Provider rewards vest over 90 days.

Creating a vault does not automatically qualify it for provider rewards. Performance does not affect provider reward eligibility. Eligibility is facts only: registered in the provider registry, created via the canonical factory, payout verified, active, disclosures and receipts current, not paused for provider fault, minimum operating age met, and so on. Performance inputs — PnL, APY, return, rank, volatility — are rejected by the scorer itself and can never affect the outcome.

The eligible provider pool is scored across four components, each a pro-rata sub-pool:

• Equal share — 40%. Split equally among all eligible provider groups — a floor that resists whale dominance.
• External TVL-days — 30%. Durable external capital over the epoch, passed through a concave anti-dominance curve. Excluded and self-dealing wallets contribute zero.
• Retention — 20%. External-capital retention: cohort retention and median external depositor age.
• Operational quality — 10%. Objective operational hygiene only — never performance, PnL, APY, or rank.

A dominance cap of 25% limits any single group; excess rolls over to the next provider epoch (never back to the capped group, never to the treasury).

Vesting

Vault Contributor rewards vest over 30 days and Vault Provider rewards over 90 days, both linearly. Contributor vesting is enforced on-chain by the contributor distributor. The 90-day provider vest is a published methodology schedule today; making it binding on-chain is a documented, Safe-gated contract delta that has not shipped yet. Nothing is claimable before its epoch is funded and its challenge window has closed.

The monthly lifecycle

Each state is distinct and never collapsed into a vague “pending”:

• Provisional — a weekly checkpoint tally. Not final, not funded, not claimable.
• Final — the month’s score is finalized deterministically from source events.
• Challenge — published and open to challenge for 7 days. Still not claimable.
• Funded — after the challenge window, a 2-of-3 Safe action funds the epoch on-chain.
• Vesting — funded rewards vest linearly.
• Claimable — a vested, unclaimed portion is available to claim.
• Claimed / rolled over — fully claimed, or the unclaimed remainder returns (contributor dust to treasury, provider excess to the next epoch).

There are 4–5 weekly checkpoints per monthly epoch. Finalization requires the Safe; a sustained, substantiated challenge forces a deterministic recomputation before any funding.

Revocation

Only unvested provider rewards are ever revocable, only on an objective condition, and only by a 2-of-3 Safe action with a public receipt. Already-vested rewards are untouchable. Poor performance is never a ground.

Current state

The V2 methodology is published and frozen in code — the current method. Its retroactive V1→V2 catch-up is executed on-chain (reserves custodied at the Treasury Safe, treasury trued up, ≈219.16M HISS economic burn done); the forward daily cycle is run by the OpenClaw agent. No monthly epoch has been scored, finalized, or funded yet. Every dashboard reflects that honestly: reserve-custodied ≠ epoch-funded ≠ claimable, and the distinct states — reserve, epoch-funded, vesting, claimable, executed-burn — are never collapsed. Rewards are discretionary fee routing under a disclosed policy — no guaranteed return, no APY, no yield promise. Not a performance claim. Historical fee distributions are not forecasts.